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Keeping inflation low and stable requires credible, 
committed and transparent policies that guide expectations. 
According to Blinder and others (2008), as it became 
increasingly clear that managing expectations is a useful 
part of monetary policy, communications policy rose 
in stature from a nuisance to a key instrument in the 
central banker’s toolkit. The analysis of central bank 
communication is particularly important in emerging 
economies with an inflation-targeting regime, because 
the uncertainties about inflation control in such countries 
(Mishkin and Savastano, 2001) make it more difficult 
to guide expectations.
According to Blinder and others (2008, p. 940), 
“communication can be an important and powerful part 
of the central bank’s toolkit since it has the ability to 
move financial markets”. However, empirical evidence 
is still necessary. As Blinder and others (2008, p. 941) 
stressed, “The limited number of studies that try to assess 
the directional intent of the central bank’s messages 
generally find that markets move in the ‘right’ direction 
– that is, what used to be called ‘announcement effects’ 
help the central bank rather than hinder it. But there has 
been relatively little such research to date.… We need 
more evidence in order to be convinced on this point, 
plus further analysis of how, if at all, creating this type 
of directional news raises welfare”.
The literature for developed countries is wide and 
growing.1 Research on emerging countries is scarce, 
however. This study analyses monetary policy and 
central bank communication in Brazil. Because Brazil 
1  For example, Kohn and Sack (2004); Connolly and Kohler (2004); 
Musard-Gies (2006); Andersson, Dillén and Sellin (2006); Rosa and 
Verga (2007); Reeves and Sawicki (2007); Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2007a and 2009); Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010); Brand, Buncic and
represents an important emerging country under inflation 
targeting, and given the increasing relevance of central 
bank communication, the paper studies the minutes of 
the Monetary Policy Committee (copom) meetings to 
assess the influence of monetary policy and central bank 
communications on the short end of the term structure 
of interest rates. 
The study contributes to the literature in the following 
ways. First, unlike all previous studies on central bank 
communication, this paper complements the ordinary 
least squares (ols) analysis by using generalized method 
of moments (gmm) and vector autoregression (var) to 
examine the direction taken by interest rates when affected 
by central bank communications and monetary policy. 
(To my knowledge, no study uses the var methodology to 
analyse dynamically whether central bank communication 
influences the direction of interest rates.) Second, the 
study provides an analysis for the term structure of an 
important emerging country under inflation targeting, 
based on the ideas presented in Fuhrer and Moore (1995a 
and 1995b), Fuhrer (1996) and Walsh (2010). The type 
of analysis presented in this paper has never been done 
by any other study on central bank communication.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents 
a brief overview of the literature. Section III uses the 
minutes of the copom meetings to examine the impact 
of monetary policy and central bank communications 
on the short end of the term structure of interest rates 
in Brazil and discusses the empirical results. The last 
section presents the conclusions. 
I
introduction 
Turunen (2010); Hayo, Kutan and Neuenkirch (2010); Ranaldo and 
Rossi (2010); Sturm and de Hann (2011); Rosa (2011); Berger, de 
Haan and Sturm (2011).
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Inflation targeting was widely adopted in the early 
1990s, which heightened awareness of the importance 
of transparency for the process of expectations formation 
(Geraats, 2002; de Mendonça and Simão-Filho, 2007). In 
a forward-looking environment, monetary policy largely 
becomes an art of managing the expectations of private 
agents (Woodford, 2003). Consequently, studies about 
central bank communication have gained importance in 
the literature on this regime.
The degree of transparency and the regularity 
of the communication process depend on the level of 
discretion in the monetary regime adopted. Thus, the 
complexity of communication is associated with the 
type of monetary regime adopted. Regimes with less 
discretion are related to a more simple communication, 
whereas more flexible arrangements that allow greater 
discretion, such as inflation targeting, involve more 
complex communication (Blinder and others, 2008).
Inflation-targeting central banks generally announce 
four aspects of monetary policy: its objectives and 
strategies, the reasons behind political decisions, the 
outlook on the state of the economy and future monetary 
policy decisions. Since the objectives and strategies of 
central banks tend to be stable and thus vary less over 
time than the other three aspects, communications on 
this aspect are less frequent.
The literature includes two main approaches to 
analysing the influence of communications on the 
economy, which are complementary. One explores the 
impact of central bank communications on financial 
markets (for example, Kohn and Sack, 2004; Reeves 
and Sawicki, 2007; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007a 
and 2009), while the other looks at the influence of 
different communication strategies among central banks 
on the economic performance (for example, Fujiwara, 
2005; Rozkrut and others, 2007). Since central bank 
communications influence expectations for the future 
short-term interest rate, they also affect the long-term 
rates and, therefore, financial market prices. These prices 
can, in turn, affect some macroeconomic variables, such 
as inflation and output. However, while communications 
and monetary policy instantly affect the financial market, 
the economy as a whole is affected gradually and by 
several other factors.
There are basically three approaches to measuring 
central bank communication. The first seeks to 
classify all central bank communications according 
to their content or signals (possible intentions), using 
a numerical scale to encode these ratings (Jansen and 
De Haan, 2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007b; Rosa 
and Verga, 2007; Musard-Gies, 2006). Some studies use 
the codes to indicate direction (Jansen and De Haan, 
2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007b). The second 
approach examines all forms of media communication 
by the Monetary Policy Committee or its members that 
is relevant for monetary policy (Jansen and De Haan, 
2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007b). In this case, the 
task is to extract information from statements, speeches, 
minutes and reports using a set of search words. When 
the objective is to assess the trend of monetary policy, 
the search includes the name of the committee member 
and the key words interest rate, monetary policy and 
inflation. When the objective is to assess the future 
economic environment, the key words are economy 
and economic outlook. Finally, the third approach takes 
advantage of some institutional features of the process 
of announcing monetary policy decisions to measure the 
impact of communications. An example of this approach 
is Brand, Buncic and Turunen (2010), who separate the 
reactions of the financial market into two effects: the 
monetary policy effect and the communication effect 
of the European Central Bank. 
Different approaches have been developed in 
the literature to measure the effects of central bank 
communications (see Blinder and others, 2008, for more 
details). Starting with Kohn and Sack (2004), some studies 
have examined the effects of central bank communication 
events on the volatility of financial variables (Blinder and 
others, 2008, present several of these studies). The focus 
on volatility makes it unnecessary to assign a direction 
to each statement. In other studies, communications 
are quantified in order to assess both the direction (for 
example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007b) and magnitude 
(for example, Berger and others, 2011) of the effects on 
asset prices and thus to determine the extent to which a 
given communication has its intended effects. 
In recent years, the general move in central banks 
to enhance their transparency, accountability and 
II
Central bank communications and  
monetary policy: literature review 
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communication has motivated a number of studies on 
the influence of central bank communication on financial 
markets.2 This literature is mostly directed to developed 
countries, however. For Brazil, Costa Filho and Rocha 
(2009) discuss the role of communication in the conduct 
of monetary policy by the Central Bank of Brazil. They 
build a glossary that translates the qualitative information 
contained in the copom minutes into an ordered scale 
 
2  For example, Kohn and Sack (2004); Connolly and Kohler (2004); 
Musard-Gies (2006); Andersson, Dillén and Sellin (2006); Rosa and 
Verga (2007); Reeves and Sawicki (2007); Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2007a and 2009); Brand, Buncic and Turunen (2010); Berger, de 
Haan and Sturm (2011).
index, similar to the one built by Rosa and Verga (2007). 
They find evidence of consistent behaviour by the copom, 
in the sense that its words are followed by actions in 
the same direction. Moreover, based on estimates of 
Taylor rules, they also find evidence that the index helps 
to understand interest setting. In a later work, (Costa 
Filho and Rocha, 2010) these authors explore whether 
better communication from the Central Bank of Brazil 
makes monetary policy more predictable. They find that 
interest rates increase on release days, indicating that 
central bank communication has a conservative bias, 
while interest rate volatility decreases. They also find 
evidence that the market’s reaction is independent of 
the content released, although signals of interest rate 
reduction imply a decrease in volatility.
III
Communications from the Central Bank of Brazil
Brazil adopted an inflation-targeting regime in 1999. 
Since then, the conduct of monetary policy by the 
Central Bank of Brazil has become more transparent 
and accountable, and communications more frequent 
and open, as policymakers realized the importance 
that expectations play in the economy. This change is 
consistent with the trend of the world’s major central 
banks, especially those with inflation targeting. 
In this paper, I use the information provided through 
the minutes of copom meetings to analyse the Brazilian 
case. The regular copom meetings are spread over two 
days, with the first session on Tuesdays and the second 
session on Wednesdays. On the first day of the meeting, 
the department heads present an overview of the economic 
environment. On the second day, the deputy-governors 
of monetary policy and economic policy present the 
alternatives for the short-term interest rate and their 
policy recommendations. Other members of the Board 
make their own comments and proposals, and then 
the members vote on a final proposal, with the goal of 
reaching a consensus decision. The final decision –the 
Special System of Clearance and Custody (selic) rate 
target and the bias, if any– is then announced. 
Eight days after each meeting, the Committee releases 
the meeting minutes on the central bank’s website. The 
minutes provide a summary of the copom discussions. 
The document describes the state of the economy, what 
factors were relevant to the decision taken at the meeting 
and the outlook for future meetings.
Based on all the available information, the agents 
seek to estimate the state of the economy in the long term 
and the future behaviour of the policymaker in terms 
of monetary policy. In this sense, monetary policy and 
the committee’s communications through the minutes 
will be effective if they can guide agents’ expectations.
1. Estimation
This section estimates the effects of central bank 
communications on the short end of the term structure 
of interest rates in Brazil. Central bank communications 
are quantified through dummy variables, and the interest 
rate spread is the difference between an interest rate 
with a specific maturity up to one year (measured by a 
swap rate) and the basic interest rate (measured by the 
selic rate).3 
3  The choice of swap rates as measures of interest rates with different 
maturities follows the literature on the term structure of interest rates 
in the Brazilian economy. For example, Lima and Issler (2003), Tabak 
and Tabata (2004) and Montes and Bastos (2011) use the same swap 
rates as proxies for long-term interest rates and for the interest rate 
spread. For more details, see Lima and Issler (2003), Tabak and Tabata 
(2004) and Montes and Bastos (2011).
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For this purpose, the following data were used in 
the analysis: 360-day swap reference rate, based on the 
pre-set interbank (di) rate on the Brazilian Mercantile and 
Futures Exchange (bm&f), per cent per year;4 180-day 
swap reference rate, based on the pre-set di rate on the 
bm&f, per cent per year;5 120-day swap reference rate, 
based on the pre-set di rate on the bm&f, per cent per 
year;6 and the annualized selic interest rate, accumulated 
in the month.7 
The period of analysis runs from June 2003 to 
April 2011, comprising the 85th meeting until the 158th 
meeting of the copom (74 observations). I chose to start 
with the 85th meeting because until this meeting, there 
was no clear rule on the disclosure of the minutes of 
previous meetings. The minutes have only been regularly 
released since the 85th meeting.
The dummy variables are built based on a prepared 
glossary (see table A.1 in the appendix), which is 
intended to codify the words and expressions contained 
in the minutes of the copom. The glossary was inspired 
by the work of Rosa and Verga (2007). When there is 
an indication in the minutes that the copom aims to 
reduce the selic rate at its next meeting, the dummy 
variable dummy_red assumes a value of one (and zero 
otherwise). When there is an indication that the copom 
will not change the selic rate at its next meeting, the 
dummy variable dummy_neutra assumes a value of one 
(and zero otherwise). When there is an indication that 
the copom aims to increase the selic rate at its next 
meeting, the dummy variable dummy_aum takes a value 
of one (and zero otherwise).
To analyse the impact of these communications on 
the short end of the interest-rate term structure in Brazil, 
three equations were estimated based on the following 
basic equation:8
 Spreadkt = βlkdummy_aumt +
 β2kdummy_neutrat + β3kdummy_redt + ζkt, 
(1)
where Spreadkt is the difference between the swap rate 
with maturity k (k = 120, 180, 360) and the basic interest 
rate (selic) prevailing at date t, and ζkt represents the error 
terms (white noise). The series of Swap_360, Swap_180 
and Swap_120 were based on information from the day 
after the release of the copom minutes on the website 
4  Code 7806 (website of the Central Bank of Brazil).
5  Code 7805 (website of the Central Bank of Brazil).
6  Code 7804 (website of the Central Bank of Brazil).
7  Code 4189 (website of the Central Bank of Brazil).
8  The equations were estimated without the intercept to avoid perfect 
multi-collinearity.
of the Central Bank of Brazil. The expected results are 
β1k > 0, β2k = 0 (that is, no significance) and β3k < 0.
The copom communications will be effective if 
interest-rate expectations behave according to the monetary 
authority’s signal, as identified in the minutes. The idea 
is to check whether monetary policy and communications 
serve as guides for interest-rate expectations and, as a 
consequence, affect the short end of the interest-rate 
term structure in Brazil in the desired direction. The 
analysis was performed through ols and var using the 
EViews 7 software.
Table 1 reveals that the estimated coefficients for two 
of the dummy variables (dummy_aum and dummy_red) 
are significant for all maturities and present the expected 
signs. The estimated coefficients for the neutral dummy 
variable (dummy_neutra) are not statistically significant, 
which means that when copom indicates that it will not 
change the selic rate, spreads do not change.
The evidence presented so far has shown that when 
the central bank indicates that it will tighten monetary 
policy, the spreads react by increasing, and when the 
central bank signals loosening, the spreads decrease. 
A relevant issue that arises concerns the influence of 
monetary policy and central bank communications on 
short-term rates, dynamically. Vector autoregressions 
(var) often employ impulse response functions because 
they support the evaluation of the impact of shocks (or 
innovations) on key variables over time (Sims, 1980). 
As pointed out by Lutkenpohl (1991), the conventional 
method applies an orthogonality assumption, so the 
result may depend on the ordering of the variables in 
the var. Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) develop the idea of the generalized 
impulse response function as a way of eliminating the 
problem of the ordering of variables in the var. The main 
argument is that the generalized impulse responses are 
invariant to any reordering of the variables in the var 
(see, for example, Ewing, 2003).
The analysis uses the selic rate, Swap_360 , Swap_180 , 
Swap_120 , dummy_red and dummy_aum. Because the 
different series for Swap_360 , Swap_180  and Swap_120 
present structural breaks in the averages (as figures A.1, 
A.2 and A.3 in the appendix show), the var includes a 
dummy variable (named dummy_break) as an exogenous 
variable, where dummy_break takes a value of one from 
meeting 85 until meeting 123, and zero otherwise.
To check if the series are stationary, that is, if the 
series do not have a unit root, both Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (kpss) and Phillips-Perron (pp) tests 
were applied (see tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix). 
The Akaike information criterion (aic), the Schwarz 
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information criterion (sic) and the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (hq) were used to select the var 
order. The results indicate that the var order is one (see 
table A.4 in the appendix). Figure 1 shows the stability 
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Source: author’s elaboration. 
Figure 2 presents the results of the generalized 
impulse response functions for a time horizon of 18 
months. The evidence indicates that when the copom 
minutes signal an increase in the selic interest rate for the 
next meeting, interest rates react by first increasing and 
then converging to equilibrium. When the copom signals 
a reduction in the selic interest rate for the next meeting, 
interest rates react by decreasing and then converging to 
equilibrium. These findings are statistically significant. 
Regarding the influence of monetary policy shocks on the 
short end of the interest-rate term structure, the results 
suggest that positive shocks on the selic interest rate 
cause an increase in interest rates. Again, these results 
are statistically significant.
The evidence obtained so far suggests that monetary 
policy and copom communications play an important 
role in the process of expectations formation about the 
behaviour of interest rates in Brazil. Because long-term 
interest rates also reflect macroeconomic aspects, I next 
examined the influence of monetary policy and copom 
communications on the short end of the interest-rate 
term structure, as well as the influence of inflation 
expectations and output deviations from its trend. To do 
so, I added the following series: output deviations (the 
difference between gdp9 and trend gdp)10 and inflation 
expectations (market expectations for inflation over the 
next 12 months, as measured by the Extended National 
Consumer Price Index (ipca).11 
9   Code 4191 (website of the Central Bank of Brazil).
10  Obtained through the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
11  Obtained from the Central Bank of Brazil website.
TABLE 1




dummy_aum 0.45*** 0.65*** 0.91***
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 
dummy_neutra -0.013 0.008 0.35
  (0.89) (0.94) (0.10)
 
dummy_red -0.75*** -0.95*** -1.14***
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Summary statistics
R2 0.54 0.55 0.45
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.53 0.43
Standard error 0.48 0.62 1.01
No. observations 74 74 74
Source: author’s estimates.
Notes: The equations are estimated using ols; p values are in parentheses.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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I then estimated the following equation, based on 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a and 1995b), Fuhrer (1996) 
and Walsh (2010), to analyse the influence of monetary 
policy, central bank communications, output deviations 







k t t k t= + +− − − −α pi 1 1 1 1δ γ*
kt+ε
( )− +S y ( )
 (2)
where S is the swap rate with maturity k (k = 120, 
180, 360), πe  represents inflation expectations (twelve 
months ahead), (y – y*) represents output deviations 
from trend (which is a measure of the economic 
cycle), r is basic interest rate (selic) and ε is the error 
term. The macroeconomic variables were used with a 
lag, because this is the set of information available to 
economic agents when they form their expectations for 
interest rates. The expected signs for the coefficients of 
the macroeconomic variables are α > 0; δ > 0 and γ > 
0 . The communication_dummies are the same dummy 
variables used before (dummy_aum, dummy_red and 
dummy_neutra). The period of the study runs from 
June 2003 to April 2011, comprising the 85th through 
the 158th meeting of the copom. 
FIGURE 2
impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock
(±2 standard errors)
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The empirical analysis was conducted using 
ordinary least squares (ols)12 and generalized method of 
moments (gmm). One reason for using gmm is that while 
ols estimates have problems of serial autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity or non-linearity, which is typical in 
macroeconomic time series, gmm provides consistent 
estimators for the regression (Hansen, 1982). 
According to Wooldridge (2001, p. 95), “to obtain 
a more efficient estimator than two-stage least squares 
(or ordinary least squares), one must have overriding 
restrictions.” I used a standard J-test to test this property 
for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 
1982). Cragg (1983) argues that using overidentification 
analysis in the selection of instrumental variables 
improves the efficiency of the estimators. The chosen 
instruments need to be dated to the period t – 1 or earlier 
to help predict the contemporaneous variables, which 
are unavailable at time t. This procedure for choosing 
instrumental variables follows Johnston (1984).13
A first condition to be analysed before applying the 
estimations is to check whether the series are stationary. 
Based on the tests, while the series of inflation expectations 
is I(1), all other series are I(0) (see tables A.2 and A.3 
in the appendix).
2. results
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the results. The estimates 
show that for all specifications, the constant is positive 
and statistically significant, except for equation (S120a) 
which is not statistically significant. Regarding the 
dummy_break, all estimated coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant, except those estimated in 
equations (S120 e) by ols and (S120 d) by gmm which are 
not statistically significant. 
With regard to inflation expectations, the results 
show that all the estimated coefficients in table 2 are 
positive, although those present in equations (S120 c), 
(S120 d) and (S120 f) by ols and (S120 c) and (S120 f) by 
gmm are not statistically significant. In table 3, the 
ols estimates indicate a positive relationship between 
 
12  The reported t-statistics in the ols estimates are based on the estimator 
of Newey and West (1987), which is consistent in the presence of both 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.
13  The gmm estimations apply the following instrumental variables:
– For Swap_120: constant, St
120(-1 to -3), dπe (-2 to -7), (y – y*) 
(-2 to -4) and r (-2 to -8)
– For Swap_180: constant, St
180(-1 to -3), dπe (-2 to -7), (y – y*) 
(-2 to -4) and r (-2 to -8)
– For Swap_360: constant, St
360(-1 to -3), dπe (-2 to -7), (y – y*) 
(-2 to -4) and r (-2 to -8)
inflation expectations and Swap_180, although it is not 
statistically significant in equation (S180d). With gmm, 
the estimated coefficients in equations (S180a), (S18b), 
(S120 d), (S120 e) and (S120 f) are all positive and statistically 
significant. The results for Swap_360 show positive, 
statistically significant coefficients in all specifications 
of both methods (see table 4). The economic explanation 
for the positive relation between inflation expectations 
and short-term rates is that the expectation of higher 
inflation leads to expectations that the central bank will 
tighten monetary policy by raising short-term interest 
rates in the future to slow economic growth and dampen 
inflationary pressures. Moreover, inflation expectations 
have the strongest impact on the longer-term interest rates 
of the short end of the term structure. This is basically 
due to the fact that inflation expectations are market 
expectations for the next 12 months.
The estimates presented in tables 2, 3 and 4 also 
show the positive influence of output deviations on short-
term rates. All specifications in table 2 are statistically 
significant, whereas in tables 3 and 4, specifications 
(S180a), (S360a) and (S360c) by both ols and by gmm 
are not statistically significant. The positive relation 
between output deviations (a measure of the business 
cycle) and short-term rates is explained as follows: 
when the economy warms up, inflationary pressures 
rise, leading economic agents to expect higher interest 
rates in the future.
Monetary policy has a direct relationship with the 
short end of the term structure, that is, when the selic 
rate increases, swap rates also rise. Based on the values 
of the estimated coefficients, this impact is smaller on 
longer-term interest rates. In this sense, the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank of Brazil, through the selic 
rate, exerts significant influence on the short end of the 
term structure.
The central bank’s communications also have a 
positive impact on short rates. The dummy variable for an 
upward signal, dummy_aum, has a positive, statistically 
significant effect on the short end of the term structure. In 
other words, when the copom minutes reveal information 
that indicates a possible increase in the selic interest 
rate at the next meeting, short-term rates, as measured 
by swap rates, increase. A comparison of the Swap_120 
and Swap_360 variables suggests that communications 
indicating tighter monetary policies in the future have 
a stronger effect on the 360-day swap rate than on the 
120-day swap rate.
For a downward signal, the results for dummy_red 
reveal a negative, statistically significant impact on the 
short end of the term structure. When the Brazilian 
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Monetary Policy Committee indicates a possible decrease 
in the selic rate at the next meeting, interest rates, as 
measured by swap rates, decrease. Once again, the results 
suggest that communications have a stronger effect on 
the 360-day rate than on the 120-day rate. 
None of the coefficients estimated for dummy_neutra 
are statistically significant. This means that when copom 
signals that the selic interest rate will not be changed 
at the next meeting, interest rates, as measured by swap 
rates, do not change as a result.
IV
Conclusions
Communication gives the Central Bank of Brazil a means 
of explaining its intentions, decisions and rationale. 
Because the central bank’s inflation-targeting framework 
allows discretion, communication becomes an important 
tool for local policymakers to explain their decisions 
and help economic agents understand how the Central 
Bank of Brazil views the state of the economy and the 
economic outlook. Economic agents are then better able 
to formulate their expectations, which has a direct effect 
on financial market variables.
To contribute to the literature on the effect of central 
bank communications and monetary policy on financial 
markets, this study has analysed the influence of these 
factors on the term structure of interest rates in Brazil. 
The study shows that monetary policy actions and 
communications by the Brazilian monetary authority 
have a significant impact on the process of expectations 
formation for interest rates with different maturities 
in Brazil. Not only do financial markets respond to 
the publication of the copom minutes, but they move 
in the desired direction. In this sense, the minutes of 
copom meetings serve as an important tool for guiding 
expectations for interest rates, since economic agents 
use the minutes of copom meetings to estimate the future 
state of the economy, which reduces uncertainty about 
future monetary policy actions.
The results highlight the beneficial effects of 
communication in providing information to the general 
public and to the markets in particular, thus serving as 
an important instrument of the central bank. According 
to the evidence found in this work, the relevance of 
communication by the monetary authority lies in its 
ability to affect expectations for future interest rates, 
which in turn inform several key decisions of economic 
agents. This is because monetary policy decisions affect 
short-term interest rates, while the relevant variables for 
monetary policy are influenced by long-term interest rates. 
Since these interest rates are determined by expectations 
about the future course of the short-term interest rates, 
the importance of central bank communication lies in 
its ability to affect market expectations.
Central bank communication is not the only variable 
determining the process of expectations formation in 
financial markets. Other variables also play a role. 
Therefore, in addition to exploring the impact of monetary 
policy and communications on interest-rate expectations, 
the study also analysed the effects of macroeconomic 
variables, such as output fluctuations and inflation 
expectations. Future research could expand the model 
to consider the conduct of other economic policies, such 
as fiscal policy by incorporating variables such as the 
debt-to-gdp ratio, the debt profile and fiscal credibility.
The financial market reaction to monetary policy 
and central bank communications is undoubtedly a 
topic of great interest to market participants and central 
banks. Investors are interested in anticipating the central 
bank’s decisions because such decisions may affect the 
value of their portfolios, while the central bank seeks 
to estimate the likely effect of monetary policy on asset 
prices and on the economy as a whole. Future research 
could productively incorporate not only the topics 
suggested by Blinder and others (2008), but also the 
influence of central bank communications on monetary-
policy transmission mechanisms through the following 
channels: (1) financial asset prices and, hence, investment 
and consumption decisions through the wealth effect; 
(2) credit, through banks’ postures and credit decisions; 
and (3) expectations for macroeconomic variables, such 
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APPENDIx
Supplementary tables and figures
TABLE A.1
glossary of key words and expressions from minutes of copom meetings
Dummy variable Key words
dummy_aum – The Central Bank will not allow supply shocks to lead to an increase in the inflation rate.
– Maintenance of the interest rate represents a non-negligible risk for meeting the target (projected inflation above target).
– Risks to achieving the goal.
– Potential inflationary impacts of supply shocks yet to materialize.
– Monetary policy should remain vigilant in order to avoid the propagation of shocks and exchange rate depreciation.
– Monetary policy firmly committed to meeting the inflation targets.
– Inflation remains high / monetary policy should be firm.
– The monetary authority will be ready to adopt an active posture if projected inflation diverges from the target.
– Inflation trend incompatible with the target.
– copom will need to be less tolerant if shocks threaten to raise inflation above the target.
dummy_neutra – Analysis of supply and demand indicates the absence of imbalances that could translate into inflationary pressures over 
the relevant horizon for the inflation-targeting regime.
– General context is favourable for (suitable for / compatible with) price stability; economic environment consistent with 
the inflation target, but risk factors need to be monitored (the question remains about the rate of decline in inflation).
– Economic activity rising, but incompatible with economic stability.
– Inflation behaviour stable in line with the expectations of copom.
– Monetary policy is appropriate, but should be administered with caution (risks remain).
– Prospects for lowering inflation towards the target, but there is a risk that inflation could remain high (inflation path 
consistent with the target). 
– Rising inflation calls for caution in monetary policy.
– Concrete probability that current inflation could deviate from the target requires additional caution in monetary policy.
dummy_red – copom decided to continue the process of monetary easing.
– Expected inflation below target/expectations consistent with the inflation risks/targets are less significant.
– Consolidation of favourable perspectives for inflation in the medium term / copom considers that there is still room for 
further cuts in the selic rate in the future.
– Benign scenario for the evolution of inflation (with reduction of uncertainties / favourable external scenario).
– Economic activity consistent with supply conditions, with low probability of inflation pressures.
Source: author’s elaboration.
copom: Monetary Policy Committee of Brazil.
selic:  Special System of Clearance and Custody.
TABLE A.2
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-schmidt-shin (KPss) stationarity test
Series Bandwidth Test 1% critical values 5% critical values 10% critical values
Swap_120 6 0.08b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Swap_180 6 0.08b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Swap_360 6 0.08b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Spread120 6 0.07
b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Spread180 6 0.07
b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Spread360 6 0.07
b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Inflation expectation 6 0.22b 0.21 0.14 0.11
d(inflation expectation) 2 0.04b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Output gap 5 0.03a 0.73 0.46 0.34
selic rate 6 0.06b 0.21 0.14 0.11
Source: author’s estimates. 
Notes: Andrews automatic bandwidth selection, using Bartlett kernel. Schwarz information criteria (sic).
selic: Special System of Clearance and Custody.
a denotes constant.
b denotes constant and trend.
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TABLE A.3
Phillips-Perron (pp) unit root test
Series Bandwidth Test 1% critical values 5% critical values 10% critical values
Swap_120 6.51 -1.738c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Swap_180 5.99 -1.654c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Swap_360 2.51 -1.614c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Spread120 1.70 -3.647
c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Spread180 1.37 -3.525
c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Spread360 0.08 -3.416
c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Inflation expectation 3.06 -2.378a -3.522 -2.901 -2.588
d(inflation expectation) 0.72 -7.150c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
Output gap 3.69 -3.304c -2.597 -1.945 -1.613
selic rate 14.5 -2.849a -3.522 -2.901 -2.588
Source: author’s estimates.
Notes: Andrews automatic bandwidth selection, using Bartlett kernel. Schwarz information criteria (sic). 
selic: Special System of Clearance and Custody.
a denotes constant.
b denotes constant and trend.
c denotes none.
TABLE A.4
aic, sc and hq criteria for var lag order
var lag order With constant Without constant
aic sic hq aic sic hq
0 7.74 7.94 7.82
1 -0.13 1.23* 0.40* -0.03* 1.13* 0.42*
2 0.14 2.68 1.15 0.25 2.60 1.18
3 0.29 4.01 1.77 0.49 4.01 1.88
4 0.53 5.42 2.47 0.82 5.52 2.68
5 0.27 6.34 2.67 0.57 6.44 2.89
6 -0.24 7.00 2.62   0.01 7.06 2.81
Source: author’s estimates.
Notes: Akaike information criterion (aic); Schwarz information criterion (sic);Hannan-Quinn (hq) information criterion. An asterisk indicates 
the lag order selected by respective criterion.
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